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Abstract: We conduct a laboratory experiment to study diﬀerent say on pay regimes in a
setting where shareholders provide incentives to a CEO for a risky project choice through a dis-
cretionary bonus scheme. We compare three diﬀerent types of shareholder voting rights (advisory,
unconditionally binding, and conditionally binding voting rights) to the baseline case where share-
holders have no say on CEO pay. We make the following observations: (1) Advisory and condi-
tionally binding voting rights do not distort CEO investment incentives. Unconditionally binding
voting rights adversely aﬀect the CEO’s investment incentives. (2) Unconditionally binding voting
rights are an eﬀective instrument to curb executive compensation. Advisory shareholder voting
rights have the opposite eﬀect and can even increase executive compensation. (3) A substantial
fraction of shareholders rejects CEO bonus proposals whenever they have the right to do so. This
eﬀect is largely independent of the type of voting right in place and becomes more pronounced
in case of poor project performance. (4) Advisory and conditionally binding voting rights have
only limited impact on firm profit and executive compensation. In contrast, unconditionally bind-
ing voting rights reduce both, firm profit and executive compensation significantly. Overall, our
results suggest that regulators should carefully evaluate dysfunctional economic consequences of
shareholder voting rights before they are introduced or before existing rules are tightened.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation, Experimental Economics, Invest-
ment Incentives, Say on Pay
JEL Classification: G34, G38, M48.
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1 Introduction
Until very recently, the decision on the total amount and the structure of executive remuneration
in public firms was in the hands of the board of directors or a particular compensation committee.
As a response to a controversial debate on seemingly ”excessive” executive pay and the mismatch
between pay and performance in some publicly-traded firms, the U.K. was the first country to intro-
duce separate shareholder voting rights on executive pay, also termed as ”Say on Pay” (henceforth
SoP). The so called Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (DRR) requires publicly listed
U.K. firms to submit their remuneration report to a mandatory shareholder vote in each financial
year1. In the meantime, other countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
and Sweden have adopted similar rules.2 In 2010, the U.S. adopted the ”Dodd-Frank Act”. Section
951 of this act contains an amendment of the Securities and Exchange Act that obliges listed firms
to conduct an advisory shareholder vote on the compensation of their top executives. In a separate
resolution, the shareholders must determine whether the vote takes place every year, every two
years or every three years3.
If SoP is not binding, as in the U.K. and the U.S., shareholders can express their dissatisfaction
with the current compensation policy but they cannot directly force the board of directors to
change it. Empirical studies on the impact of the DRR on the compensation practice of U.K. firms
provide mixed results about the economic consequences of such a rule. For example, Ferri and
Maber (2009) find no evidence that the overall level and growth rate of executive compensation
changed after the introduction of the new legislation. However, they observe an increased sensitivity
of compensation to both, negative operating performance and negative stock performance. Both,
Carter and Zamora (2009) and Alissa (2009) find that shareholder voting dissent is positively related
to excess compensation. In addition, they provide evidence that boards seem to respond to high
levels of shareholder dissatisfaction by reducing excessive compensation in subsequent periods.4
By contrast, Conyon and Sadler (2010) find a positive relation between the level of CEO pay
and average voting dissent, but they provide little evidence that a higher level of shareholder
disapproval has an impact on either, the level of compensation or the pay-for-performance sensitivity
in subsequent years.
The question whether shareholder voting rights constitute an eﬀective way to mitigate compen-
sation practices that are not in the shareholders’ best interest is debated controversially. Broadly
1 See The Directors Remuneration Report Regulations (2002).
2 See European Commission (2010) for a detailed overview of the adoption process within Europe.
3 See House of Representatives (2010) and Bainbridge (2010) for further details.
4 The evidence for board reaction found by Carter and Zamora (2009) is generally weak. Alissa (2009) also finds a
positive relation between shareholder dissatisfaction and CEO turnover in subsequent periods.
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spoken, the latter is the case if compensation exceeds the management’s market value or, if the
executive’s incentives are poorly aligned with firm performance. Recent literature has argued that
these problems are likely to arise in publicly traded firms where managers often exert substantial
control over their pay, either via influence on the board of directors or via the selection of compen-
sation consultants.5 Proponents of say on pay advocate shareholder voting rights as a promising
tool that gives shareholders a voice to curb excessive pay practices. Opponents, however, claim
that SoP allows shareholders to micromanage firms without understanding either the market for
executives or the complexity of their incentive systems.6 The critics further point out that measur-
ing the management’s contribution to firm value is a very diﬃcult task and that this diﬃculty can
provoke shareholders to refuse even properly designed and well calibrated compensation packages.7
If managers anticipate the risk of losing parts of their compensation, SoP is likely to distorts their
eﬀort and investments incentives.
Despite the concerns of its opponents that SoP is too strong an intrusion into corporate life,
it can also be argued that the predominant practice of non-binding shareholder votes does not
have enough teeth to prevent undesirable compensation practices. If boards or compensation
committees are management-friendly, they may simply ignore the shareholders’ vote and keep
on doing business as usual.8 Therefore, some shareholder activists go further and demand the
introduction of mandatory binding voting rights on executive pay.9
Public pressure calling for legislative action often prompts politicians and regulators to adopt
regulatory measures before their consequences for firms and the economy are fully understood.10
A natural and less costly alternative to the premature introduction of legislation with its poten-
tially (un-)desirable consequences is an experimental test of alternative regulatory regimes. In this
paper, we adopt this approach by testing diﬀerent shareholder voting right regimes in a laboratory
experiment. The experiment is based on a simple theoretical model in which a privately informed
5 See Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) and Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2009). See also the controversial debate
between Kaplan (2008), Walsh (2008), and Bogle (2008).
6 Jones (2009).
7 See Bean (2009), Cai and Walkling (2009), Jones (2009) or Kiviat (2008) for a discussion of the arguments raised
by both sides of the debate.
8 Likewise, even massive negative press coverage does not seem to have much impact on CEO pay, see Core, Guay
and Larcker (2008).
9 So far a binding vote on remuneration reports exists in the Netherlands and in Sweden. In Switzerland, the
shareholder activist Thomas Minder has initiated a public voting campaign demanding an annual binding vote
on the amount of executive pay for all publicly listed firms in Switzerland (The Economist, 2007).
10 The field of executive compensation seems to be a particularly fruitful playground for hasty and poorly substan-
tiated regulatory activities. Well known examples include the recently introduced bonus tax for bankers in the
U.K. and the million-dollar salary tax cap in the U.S., see Go¨x (2008).
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CEO needs to be motivated to make a goal congruent project selection on behalf of her sharehold-
ers. The investment opportunity set consists of a risky and a riskless project. The CEO privately
learns the success probability of the risky project before making the project choice. To implement
a goal congruent project decision, the firm oﬀers the CEO a bonus contract based on the realized
project cash flow. If the CEO selects the riskless project, she receives a salary but no bonus. To
make sense of shareholder voting rights, we let the CEO have limited discretion over the size of
her bonus. At the beginning of each period, the CEO thus makes separate bonus proposals for
the successful and for the unsuccessful outcome of the risky project. After the project outcome is
realized, shareholders vote on the CEO’s bonus proposal, provided they have the right to do so.
We compare a world without shareholder voting rights with three diﬀerent say on pay regimes.
First, we consider advisory shareholder votes on compensation. Second, we analyze unconditionally
binding shareholder votes. Under this regime, shareholders vote on the CEO’s bonus regardless
of the project’s performance. Third, we consider conditionally binding voting rights. Under this
regulation, shareholders can only vote in case of project failure while having no vote whatsoever in
case of project success. Equilibrium analyses of the four regimes suggest that no voting rights and
advisory voting rights are economically equivalent. Under both regimes, shareholders have no right
to restrict the CEO’s bonus. Therefore, the CEO always makes a goal congruent project choice but
extracts the maximum possible bonus. By contrast, binding voting rights suﬀer from shareholders’
moral hazard. Once the CEO has selected the risky project, dividend maximizing shareholders
have strict incentives to reject the CEO’s bonus proposal ex post. A rational CEO anticipates this
strategy and chooses the riskless project in the first place. As a consequence, CEO and shareholders
are caught up in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma that lowers executive compensation and firm profit.
This dilemma can be avoided by restricting binding voting rights to poor performance only. Since
in this case, the CEO can still extract rents if the project is successful, goal congruent investment
incentives are sustained as long as the expected bonus for a successful project remains suﬃciently
large.
We test our theoretical model in a laboratory experiment with 250 participants. The experi-
mental results largely confirm the predictions of the model and provide some additional insights.
First, we find that shareholder voting rights impede goal congruent project selection only if they
are unconditionally binding. In contrast, advisory and conditionally binding voting rights do not
distort the CEO’s investment incentives. We also find that only binding shareholder voting rights
are an eﬀective instrument to curb executive compensation. In contrast, advisory shareholder vot-
ing rights have the opposite eﬀect, that is, they lead to increased levels of executive compensation.
Third, we find that the majority of shareholders rejects bonus proposals whenever they have the
right to do so. This eﬀect is independent of the voting right regime in place and becomes more
pronounced for poor project performance. Fourth, we find that advisory and conditionally binding
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shareholder voting rights have no significant impact on executive compensation and firm profit.
Conversely, unconditionally binding voting rights allow shareholders to extract a larger share of
the realized return of the risky project. This fact discourages the CEO to choose the risky project
and thereby impedes a goal congruence project selection. Our findings show that the resulting
net eﬀect is negative such that unconditionally binding voting rights reduce both, firm profit and
executive compensation.
In summary, our analysis suggests that regulators should carefully evaluate potential dysfunc-
tional economic consequences of shareholder voting rights before introducing them or before tight-
ening existing rules. Our study suggests that advisory shareholder votes are ineﬀective in curbing
CEO compensation. In addition, our findings show that advisory shareholder voting rights can
even increase CEO compensation in poorly governed firms. Conversely, unconditionally binding
voting rights are an eﬀective instrument to curb executive pay. On the downside however, they
distort CEO investment incentives and thereby reduce firm profit. These negative consequences
can be avoided by the introduction of conditionally binding voting rights, provided that the CEO
is granted a suﬃciently large rents in case of project success.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two develops the theoretical model
and derives the hypotheses for the experimental test. Section three illustrates the experimental
design. Section four describes and discusses the experimental findings and the hypotheses tests.
Section five concludes the paper with a summary and some suggestions for future research.
2 Theory and hypothesis development
2.1 Model assumptions
The starting point of our analysis is a simple model of incentive provision for goal congruent project
selection. A risk neutral CEO runs a firm on behalf of risk neutral shareholders. The CEO’s task
consists of selecting one of two mutually exclusive projects available to the firm. Both projects
require an identical investment outlay of I0, which we normalize to zero without loss of generality.
Project P1 is riskless and yields a certain payoﬀ of y. Project P2 is risky and yields a payoﬀ of xH
in case of success and a payoﬀ of xL in case of failure, where xL < y < xH .
The probability of success equals p ∈ (0, 1). It can take two diﬀerent values, p and p, where
p > p. Let E[x(p)] = xL+p · (xH −xL) denote the expected payoﬀ of the risky project. We assume
that E[x(p)] > y > E[x(p)] so that a risk neutral investor would strictly prefer the risky (riskless)
project if p = p (if p = p). The CEO privately learns the risky project’s success probability before
deciding on its adoption. The shareholders do not have access to this information and cannot verify
the success probability ex post from observing the realized project cash flow.
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To motivate the CEO to make a goal congruent project choice, the firm oﬀers her a bonus
contract based on the realized project cash flow. The pay scheme comprises a fixed salary wi related
to the project chosen by the CEO and a bonus bj , j = L,H, contingent on the outcome of the risky
project, provided that P2 was chosen. Accordingly, the CEO receives a riskless compensation equal
to s(y) = w1 when choosing P1 and an expected compensation of E[s(x(p))] = w2+bL+p ·(bH−bL)
when choosing P2. The second expression shows that the performance based part of the bonus
payment actually equals B = bH − bL whereas bL takes the form of a guaranteed bonus that is
paid regardless of the project’s success. Since a guaranteed bonus has the same incentive eﬀect as
a salary, we normalize w2 to zero in what follows.
11
The focus of our study is not on optimal contracting but on the relative eﬃciency of incentive
compatible compensation contracts and the interplay between shareholder voting rights and project
selection incentives. A contract is incentive compatible, if it induces the CEO to make a project
choice that is in the best interest of shareholders. Strong goal congruence between CEO and
shareholders is achieved by all contracts satisfying the following two conditions:
E[s(x(p))] > s(y) > E[s(x(p))] (1)
E[x(p)− s(x(p))] > y − s(y) > E[x(p)− s(x(p))] (2)
The first condition requires that the CEO strictly prefers the risky project if p = p and the
riskless project if p = p. The second condition requires that the pay diﬀerences required to satisfy
(1) are not too large to revert the shareholders’ preference order over the two projects.
Motivated by recent literature suggesting that CEOs in poorly governed firms have some dis-
cretion over their own compensation, we assume that the CEO can propose the bonus parameters
of her compensation contract within a certain range.12 In particular, we allow the CEO to make a
bonus proposal bj ∈ [0, bj ] and assume that the firm fixes the salary w1 ≡ w so that the conditions
in (1) and (2) are satisfied for bj = bj . These upper limits prevent that the CEO is able to capture
the whole firm profit. They can be thought of being determined by an implicit outrage constraint
that is created by market forces or social costs (Bebchuk and Fried 2004).
To counteract unreasonable bonus demands by the CEO, shareholders may obtain the right
to vote on the bonus proposal at the annual shareholders’ meeting.13 We consider three diﬀerent
11 We note that a project-contingent salary might seem unusual. However, an equivalent formulation of the bonus
contract with a project-independent salary of w1 = w is always possible if we redefine the guaranteed bonus
related to P2 as G = w2 + bL −w, so that the expected pay becomes E[s(x(p)] = w +G+ p ·B.
12 See e.g. Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) or Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2009). This assumption captures the notion
that say on pay makes only sense if the CEO has some discretion over her pay. It does not imply, however, that
the majority of all listed firms are characterized by poor governance.
13 For simplicity, we assume that the salary is set in line with shareholders’ best interests. This allows us to restrict
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types of shareholder voting rights and compare them with a traditional world in which shareholders
do not have a say on pay (T1). The first scenario (T2) considers advisory shareholder votes on
compensation as they are practiced in the U.K. since 2002. Under this rule, the shareholders can
express their opinion on executive pay but they cannot actively influence CEO compensation. The
second scenario (T3) considers unconditionally binding shareholder votes, the strictest possible form
of say on pay. We consider a version where the shareholders can limit the bonus component in the
CEO’s compensation regardless of the firm’s performance. That is, the shareholders can reject the
CEO’s proposal and thereby set both bonus parameters bj to zero ex post.
Based on the empirical observation that shareholders’ voting dissent with executive compen-
sation seems to be more pronounced when firms perform poorly (Ferri and Maber, 2009), we also
consider conditional voting rights in as a third scenario (T4). We allow shareholders to reject the
CEO’s bonus proposal in case of poor performance, while giving them no voting right whatsoever
in case of project success. Hence, in T4, shareholder can reject bL, but must always accept bH . This
form of governance protects the rents of a successful CEO from expropriation, while putting the
bonus of a poorly performing CEO at risk.
2.2 Equilibrium analysis
We next analyze the project selection and voting equilibria arising from the four diﬀerent voting
regimes. The equilibrium for scenario Tk can be characterized by an outcome tuple Γ∗k = (Pi, bL, bH)
containing the CEO’s optimal project choice and the bonus payments determined by the CEO’s
bonus proposals and the shareholders’ optimal voting strategies under the four diﬀerent scenarios.
Since the CEO is interested in maximizing her compensation, she will always choose the maximum
possible bonus and set bcj = bj . Likewise, the shareholders are interested in maximizing their
return on investment net of the CEO’s pay. Since the compensation paid to the CEO reduces
the shareholders’ return and voting takes place after the project decision has been made, it is a
dominant strategy for shareholders to cut the CEO’s bonus to bsj = 0 whenever they have the right
to do so.
If shareholders have no say on pay, the CEO can determine her own bonus package within the
limits of the outrage constraint. Since (1) and (2) are satisfied for bj = bj , the CEO will make a
goal congruent project choice and receive an expected pay of
E[s(x(p))|bcL, bcH ] = bL + p · (bH − bL) for p = p (3)
and s(y) = w for p = p. If shareholders have advisory voting rights, they can reject the CEO’s bonus
proposal. Nevertheless, since the vote has no impact on compensation, the CEO can extract the
the potential voting rights to the CEO’s bonus payment.
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same compensation as if the shareholders had no voting rights. Therefore, the equilibrium outcomes
for scenarios T1 and T2 are identical and given by the outcome tuple Γ∗1 = Γ∗2 = (P2, bL, bH). This
prediction of our model is largely consistent with recent empirical evidence on the impact of advisory
shareholder votes in the UK that found little or no evidence for changes in the level and structure
of CEO compensation after the introduction of advisory shareholder voting rights (Conyon and
Sadler, 2009, Ferri and Maber, 2009).
The situation changes dramatically if shareholders have unconditionally binding voting rights.
As argued above, the rational strategy of shareholders consists of cutting the CEO’s compensation
to the lowest possible level, that is, to bsj = 0. The CEO will correctly anticipate the shareholders’
equilibrium strategy and realize that E[s(x(p))|bsL, bsH ] = 0. Since w > 0, she will select the riskless
project in the first place. The unique subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium involves the outcome
tuple Γ∗3 = (P1, 0, 0). This outcome is ineﬃcient since w < E[s(x(p))|bcL, bcH ] and y−w < E[x(p)]−
E[s(x(p))|bcL, bcH ] for incentive compatible contracts from (2). In fact, the players are facing a
sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Both parties could increase their payoﬀ by adopting strategies that
implement the outcome tuple Γ∗1. However, since shareholders cannot commit not to reject the
bonus proposal ex post, Γ∗1 is not an equilibrium outcome. Thus, moral hazard on the part of
shareholders impedes the eﬃciency of unconditionally binding shareholder voting rights.
The prisoner’s dilemma can be avoided by introducing conditionally binding voting rights.
Repeatedly, shareholders have been found particularly dissatisfied with bonus payments in case of
poor firm performance. It therefore seems reasonable to restrict shareholder voting rights to poor
outcomes. In our model, this situation arises if the CEO chooses the risky project and the project
fails thereafter. In this case, the shareholders would rationally reject the bonus proposal and set
bsL = 0. However, if the project is successful, the CEO receives the proposed bonus b
c
H = bH . At the
project selection stage, the manager evaluates the expected compensation given the shareholders’
equilibrium strategy and adopts the risky project P2 if
E[s(x(p))|bsL, bcH ] = p · bH > w. (4)
Conditional shareholder voting rights can give rise to two diﬀerent equilibria. If condition (4) does
not hold, the manager prefers the riskless project and the equilibrium outcome is equivalent to Γ∗3.
However, the more interesting case occurs if (4) holds: the CEO makes a goal congruent project
choice and the equilibrium outcome equals Γ∗4 = (P2, 0, bH). Hence, conditional voting rights allow
to implement the goal congruent project choice at a lower cost than scenarios T1 and T2 because
bonuses are only paid out in case of project success, but not in case of project failure. Interestingly,
condition (4) is more likely for a given success probability p if the manager has more discretion over
her bonus bH .
14 In our experimental test of the model, we calibrate the parameters of the decision
14 In fact, as long as E[x(p)]− y > p · bH −w, the shareholders will still prefer the risky project even if they receive
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problem so that condition (4) holds. Accordingly, our hypotheses are based on the premise that
conditional shareholder voting give rise to the equilibrium outcome Γ∗4 = (P2, 0, bH).
2.3 Hypotheses development
Our theoretical analysis suggests several predictions concerning the impact of shareholder voting
rights on the selection of investment projects, the CEO’s bonus proposals, the shareholders’ voting
behavior, the total amount of executive pay, and firm profit. We organize the hypotheses along the
decision sequence of our model.
The first group of hypotheses deals with the impact of shareholder voting rights on goal con-
gruent project selection. Goal congruence requires that the CEO selects the risky project for p = p
and the riskless project for p = p. Our analysis predicts that advisory voting rights have no eﬀect
on goal congruence because they do not impact compensation. Consequently, a CEO makes the
same project choice independent of whether shareholders have advisory voting rights or no voting
rights at all.
With unconditionally binding voting rights, the CEO anticipates that rational shareholders
will reject her bonus proposal ex post. Therefore, she always prefers the riskless over the risky
project regardless of the risky project’s prospects. Thus, binding shareholder voting rights can
curb executive compensation. However, they can also significantly distort goal congruent project
selection. Conditionally binding voting rights do not impede goal congruence if the CEO’s expected
rent for a successful project is larger than the fixed salary for the riskless project. Since we calibrate
the parameters of the experiment according to condition (4), we do not expect that conditional
shareholder voting rights impede goal congruence. These predictions can be summarized in terms
of three hypotheses on the impact of shareholder voting rights on goal congruent project selection:
H1a: Advisory shareholder voting rights have no impact on goal congruent project
selection.
H1b: Unconditionally binding shareholder voting rights are detrimental to goal con-
gruent project selection.
H1c: Conditionally binding shareholder voting rights have no impact on goal congruent
project selection.
The second group of hypotheses refers to the impact of shareholder voting rights on the optimal
strategies of the players. As argued in section 2.2, a rational and self-interested CEO will always
a lower share of the expected surplus.
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propose the highest possible bonus and a rational and self-interested shareholders will cut the bonus
of the CEO to zero regardless of the project outcome. Based on the predictions of our theoretical
model, we expect the following two hypotheses to hold:
H2a: The CEO always demands the maximum possible bonus for each possible outcome
independent of the voting right regime in place.
H2b: Provided they have the right to vote, shareholders always reject the CEO’s bonus
proposal independent of the project outcome.
The last group of hypotheses concerns the impact of shareholder voting rights on CEO com-
pensation and firm profit. First, our model predicts that advisory shareholder voting rights have
no impact on CEO compensation and firm profit. This is so because with advisory votes, a CEO
can always ignore the vote and pocket the proposed bonus anyway. In contrast, unconditionally
binding voting rights shift the bargaining power to shareholders. Income maximizing shareholders
will therefore reject the bonus proposal and reduce total compensation accordingly. A CEO who
correctly anticipates the shareholders’ optimal voting strategy, will always select the riskless project
in the first place. As a consequence, she will receive a lower total compensation compared to the
benchmark case where shareholders have no voting rights. Likewise, firm profit will also be lower
in case of unconditionally binding shareholder voting rights. Shareholders can only benefit from
their equilibrium voting behavior if the CEO erroneously deviates from her dominant strategy and
adopts the risky project. Only then can shareholders increase their dividend by rejecting the CEO’s
bonus proposal.
With conditionally binding voting rights, shareholders can turn down the CEO’s bonus proposal
only in case of project failure. Therefore, and given that (4) holds, the CEO selects the risky project
but receives a lower compensation than without shareholder voting rights. On the other hand,
shareholders benefit form the same investment returns as without shareholder voting rights but they
face lower compensation cost because of the limited bonus payments in case of poor performance.
Accordingly, we expect conditionally binding voting rights to reduce CEO compensation and to
increase firm profit. These results can be summarized in terms of the following three hypotheses:
H3a: Advisory shareholder voting rights have no impact on total CEO compensation
and firm profit.
H3b: Unconditionally binding shareholder voting rights reduce total CEO compensa-
tion and firm profit.
H3c: Conditionally binding shareholder voting rights reduce total CEO compensation
and increase firm profit.
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3 Experiment
3.1 Participants and Design
To test the predictions of our theoretical model, we conducted an experiment with a total number
of 250 undergraduate students with major in business administration from a large Swiss university.
Half of the subjects adopted the role of a CEO and the other half assumed the role of a representative
shareholder. The participants were randomly assigned to their roles and kept them during the entire
experiment.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
We ran the experiment with four diﬀerent treatments reflecting the four voting right regimes an-
alyzed in the theoretical model. For each treatment we conducted two experimental sessions to
which we randomly assigned diﬀerent individuals. Participants in each session were divided into
4 diﬀerent matching groups defining a subset of individuals that interact during the experiment.
Participants were informed that the first two rounds were training periods and that the payoﬀs
won during these rounds would be reset to zero. We did not inform the participants about how
many rounds the game would last. During the experiment, participants then interacted for a to-
tal of 21 rounds. After each round, the participants’ computer screens indicated both, the payoﬀ
that was gained during the last round and the accumulated game payoﬀ up to the current round.
Before each round, we randomly matched each CEO with a representative shareholder from the
same matching group. This procedure assures that observations are statistically independent across
matching groups. The breakdown of participants into treatments, sessions, and matching groups
is given in Table A-1 in the appendix.
3.2 Procedure
The participants were separated by partitions and interacted anonymously through a computer
network. At the beginning of each session, participants received a brief oral introduction and
detailed written instructions concerning their roles, the investment opportunity set, the payoﬀs,
the information available to the CEO and the shareholders, and the decisions they were supposed
to take. As in the theoretical model, the opportunity set consisted of two projects, a riskless project
P1 and a risky project P2.
[please insert Table 1 about here]
As shown in Table 1, P1 yields a riskless return of 10, 000 Experimental Currency Units (ECU),
of which the CEO receives a fixed salary of 2, 000 ECU. The resulting firm profit equals 8, 000 ECU.
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The risky project yields a return of 25, 000 ECU in case of success and 5, 000 ECU in case of failure.
If choosing P2, the CEO receives no salary but a bonus of up to 5, 000 ECU (1, 000 ECU) in case
of a success (failure). The firm’s profit is the diﬀerence between project return and the CEO’s pay.
Participants assuming the role of shareholders were informed that they would represent a typical
large shareholder entitled to receive a dividend of 10% out of the firm’s profit.
We informed all participants that there were two possible probability distributions for the risky
project. We set the probability of success for the first distribution to p = 0.8 and for the second
distribution to p = 0.05. These values yield clear-cut preference relations for the project choice that
even hold for CEOs that substantially violate the risk neutrality assumption employed in the theo-
retical model. In fact, for the maximum bonus attainable by the CEO, the expected compensation
equals E[s(x(p))|bL, bH ] = 4, 200 ECU for the first distribution and E[s(x(p))|bL, bH ] = 1, 200 ECU
for the second as compared to a salary of w = 2, 000 ECU that the CEO receives upon choosing
P1.
In each round, the CEO privately learns the probability distribution and selects a project.
Since a nontrivial investment decision and an interaction between CEO and shareholders can only
be expected for a high probability of success, we communicated p = 0.8 to the CEO in all but
one round. As a control for the consistency of investment decisions with the predictions of our
theoretical model, we informed CEOs in round 4 that the probability of success was only p = 0.05.
In line with our expectations, an average proportion of 84.8% of the CEO’s across all treatments,
selected the riskless project P1 in this round. The analysis of the experimental data in section 4
is based on the 20 rounds for which the success probability was high. Throughout the experiment
and in all treatments, project P2 was successful 15 times and failed 6 times (round 4, 9, 13, 16,
19, and 21). The conditional probability of success for the high success probability sample (that
excludes round 4) equals 15/20 = 0.75. This value is largely consistent with the success probability
we communicated to the participants.
If the CEO selects P2, she is asked to propose a bonus of up to 5, 000 ECU (1, 000 ECU) in case
of project success (failure). These numbers represent exactly 20% of the respective project return.
After submitting the bonus proposal, both players are informed about the project’s success and the
resulting cash return for the firm. If P1 was chosen, the CEO receives her salary, the shareholders
receive their dividend, and the round ends. If P2 was chosen, the shareholders are informed about
the CEO’s bonus proposal and asked to vote on it whenever they have the right to do so. In
treatment T1 shareholders have no voting rights. Therefore, the CEO receives the proposed bonus
for the realized project outcome. The shareholders are informed about the CEO’s pay and receive
their dividend.
In the other three treatments, shareholders are asked to either accept or refuse the CEO’s
bonus proposal. In T2, the vote is advisory and does not impact CEO pay. As in T1, the CEO
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receives the proposed bonus and shareholders receive their dividend. In T3 shareholders can refuse
the bonus for both project outcomes. If they do so, the CEO receives a compensation of zero
and shareholders increase their dividend by an amount equal to 10% of the refused bonus. If they
accept the proposal, the game ends as in T1 and T2. In T4, shareholders are only allowed to vote
if P2 fails. If they refuse the proposed bonus in case of project failure, the game ends as in T3. If
they accept it, it ends as in T1 and T2. The game was repeated 21 times for each treatment. Before
each round, players were informed that they face diﬀerent shareholders and CEOs, respectively.
Finally, participants were paid out. They received a fixed participation fee of 1, 000 ECU and 10
bonus points on the final course exam.15 In addition, participants received a performance-contingent
payment based on the compensation and dividends realized during the experiment. Remuneration
was paid out in CHF at a conversion rate of 0.60 CHF for each 1, 000 ECU earned during the ex-
periment. The average remuneration among all participants was CHF 29.77. Shareholders received
an average dividend of CHF 19.73, whereas CEOs realized an average compensation of CHF 39.81
during the whole experiment. Across all treatments, payoﬀs for CEOs (shareholders) were within a
range of CHF 13.80 (CHF 12.72) and CHF 49.80 (CHF 22.65). A detailed overview of the payoﬀs
for the diﬀerent treatments is given in Table A-2 in the appendix.
The experiment lasted about 50 minutes. At the end of the experiment, participants filled
out exit questionnaires that contained several manipulation and comprehension checks to verify
whether the participants correctly understood the game, its payoﬀ structure, and their choice
set. The analyses of these manipulation checks revealed that the participants understood the
experimental task, felt able to solve it and did so with suﬃcient care.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
We begin the presentation of experimental results with an overview of the descriptive statistics for
the relevant variables of our model.16 The first variable of interest is the project choice made by
the CEOs. The results for the four treatments are presented in the first two columns of Table 2.
15 The maximal number of points that can be achieved in the final exam is 240. Students were given the alterna-
tive opportunity to earn the 10 bonus points by solving an exercise that required the same time investment as
participating in the experiment.
16 All results presented in this section are calculated for the 20 rounds in which the success probability for the risky
project was 0.8. Since the sample was split into CEOs and shareholders, it contains 20 observations for randomly
matched group of players, yielding a total number of 2’500 observations for the relevant sample.
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It can be seen that around 95% of all CEOs chose the risky project P2 in treatments T1 (95.94%),
T2 (95.63%) and T4 (95.00%) but only 55.34% of the CEOs did so in treatment T3.
[please insert Table 2 about here]
Table 2 also shows the average bonus proposals made by CEOs. The mean bonus proposals for
successful projects in treatments T1 (4, 613.14), T2 (4, 849.82) and T4 (4, 850.92) are of the same
order of magnitude and considerably higher than for T3 (3, 414.61). Likewise, the mean bonus pro-
posals for unsuccessful projects in treatments T3 (509.50) and T4 (551.66) are visibly lower than in
treatments T1 (804.17) and T2 (896.06). Interestingly, the highest bonuses are demanded with ad-
visory shareholder voting rights. The observed proportions of goal-congruent project choices are in
line with the theoretical model that predicted an ineﬃcient investment decision for unconditionally
binding shareholder voting rights. However, it is striking that CEOs seem to accommodate share-
holders with their bonus demands whenever the voting rights are binding, that is, for treatment
T3 and for unsuccessful projects in T4. These observations suggest that binding voting rights are
an eﬀective instrument to avoid excessive bonus proposals. At least some CEOs seem to hope that
modest bonus demands will prevent shareholder from rejecting them.
[please insert Table 3 about here]
The shareholder votes for the relevant treatments are presented in Table 3. The average voting
dissent for successful projects equals 44.29% as compared to 70.24% for unsuccessful projects.
Shareholders seem to be more willing to reward CEOs for good than for poor results even if both
outcomes are the consequence of an eﬃcient project decision. In contrast, the enforceability of
voting rights does not appear to have a clear impact on shareholders’ voting behavior. For example,
the average voting dissent for unsuccessful projects and advisory voting rights (70.97%) is of the
same order of magnitude as for conditionally binding voting rights (73.83%). Likewise, comparing
advisory (T2) and unconditionally binding voting rights (T3) yields a higher voting dissent for the
latter in case of successful projects (40.04% vs. 51.98%) but a lower voting dissent for unsuccessful
projects (70.97% vs. 60.87%).
[please insert Table 4 about here]
The mean values of CEO compensation, firm profit and total welfare (CEO compensation plus
firm profit) are given in Table 4. It appears that all three measures are of the same order of
magnitude for treatments T1, T2 and T4 (CEO compensation is 3, 617, 3, 770, and 3, 597; firm profit
is 16, 086, 15, 730, and 15, 997) but significantly lower for treatment T3 (CEO compensation: 1, 581;
15
firm profit: 14, 342). These results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. The
figures in Table 4 suggest that unconditionally binding shareholder voting rights are an eﬀective
instrument to reduce executive pay. However, they also indicate that restricting executive pay is
costly to shareholders. As shown in Table 2, only 55.34% of all CEOs in T3 make a goal congruent
project decision. Hence, CEOs seem to anticipate the risk that shareholders will turn down bonus
proposals to increase dividends.17 As a consequence, firm profit and total welfare are considerably
lower than with the alternative voting mechanisms.
The data also suggest that binding shareholder voting rights do not impede eﬃciency if they are
restricted to poor outcomes only. In fact, compensation and firm profit are roughly the same with
conditionally binding (CEO compensation: 3, 597; firm profit: 15, 997) and no shareholder voting
rights (CEO compensation: 3, 617; firm profit: 16, 086), whereas CEO compensation is slightly
higher (3, 770) and firm profit is somewhat lower (15, 730) with advisory shareholder voting rights.
4.2 Hypotheses tests
We first test the hypotheses on the impact of shareholder voting rights on goal congruent project
selection. For the relevant sample, goal congruence requires that the CEO selects the risky project.
Panel A of Table 5 exhibits the mean diﬀerence in the proportions of risky project choices for the
four diﬀerent voting right regimes.
[please insert Table 5 about here]
The first line of the table measures the impact of adopting shareholder voting rights in a pre-
viously unregulated jurisdiction and thereby allows to test H1a-H1c. The introduction of advisory
voting rights slightly decreases the proportion of risky project choices but this diﬀerence is small
(0.31%) and not significant. Likewise, binding shareholder voting rights reduce the CEOs’ will-
ingness to invest in the risky project. For conditionally binding voting rights, the diﬀerence is
again small (0.94%) and insignificant but for unconditionally binding shareholder voting rights we
observe a significant reduction of 40.59% (t = -18.38, p < 0.000, two-tailed) in the proportion of
risky project choices.
As an additional test for diﬀerences between treatments, we run a robust probit regression
of dummy variables for the three voting right treatments on CEO project choice. The results of
the probit regression are consistent with the mean diﬀerence tests shown in Panel A. Without
17 Indeed, mean executive compensation given that the CEO selects the risky project drops from 3,685 ECU in T1
to 1,242 ECU in T3. At the same time firm profit, given that P2 is selected, increases from 16,429 ECU in T1 to
19,459 ECU in T3 due to the binding say on pay. See table A-3 in the appendix for details.
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shareholder voting rights the probability of a risky project choice equals Φ−1(1.7435) = 0.9594,
where Φ denotes the distribution function of the standard normal distribution. An introduction of
unconditionally binding shareholder voting rights reduces the likelihood of a risky project choice
to Φ−1(1.7435 − 1.6091) = 0.5536. Both coeﬃcients are significant (z-score = 19.49 (-15.54), p <
0.000, two-tailed). We conclude that we cannot reject H1a, H1b or H1c.
This observation is consistent with the cross comparisons among the three diﬀerent types of
voting rights under consideration shown in Panel A of Table 5. In fact, moving from advisory
to unconditionally binding voting rights reduces the average fraction of risky project choices by
40.28%, whereas converting an unconditionally into a conditionally binding voting right increases
the mean proportion of risky project choices by 39.66%. Both mean diﬀerences are significant
(t = -18.15 (17.71), p < 0.000, two-tailed). We also observe a small but insignificant diﬀerence
between advisory and conditionally binding voting rights (-0.63%). Overall, these results suggest
that unconditionally binding shareholder voting rights have a strong negative impact on the CEOs’
investment incentives, whereas less restrictive forms of shareholder voting rights do not impede
goal congruent project selection.
Result 1: Shareholder voting rights impede goal congruence only if they are uncondi-
tionally binding.
We next analyze the impact of shareholder voting rights on CEO bonus proposals. The theoret-
ical model suggests that rational and self-interested CEOs will always propose the highest possible
bonus independent of the project outcome and of the shareholder voting rights regime in place. To
measure the extent of the CEOs’ self-interest, we relate the actual bonus proposals to the bonus
ceiling for each of the two states. Panel A of Table 6 compares the mean diﬀerence in the relative
size of bonus demands for successful and unsuccessful project outcomes.
[please insert Table 6 about here]
Average bonus demands for the successful project range from 68.29% of the maximum bonus of
5, 000 ECU in T3 to around 97% of the upper limit in T2 (97.00%) and T4 (97.02%). For unsuccessful
projects, the mean bonus demands vary from 50.95% of the 1, 000 ECU limit in T3 to 89.61% for
T2. The third column of Table 6 shows the diﬀerences between relative bonus demands for good
and poor project performance. It is positive and significant for all treatments and ranges from
7.39% in T2 to a maximum of 41.85% in T4 (p < 0.000, two-tailed for all cases). Although CEOs
demand nearly the maximum bonus in two out of eight cases, these results contradict hypothesis
H2a. Evidently, CEOs demand much higher bonuses for good than for bad outcomes but the
diﬀerence appears to depend on the type of voting right in place.
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Panels B and C of Table 6 show the impact of shareholder voting rights on CEO bonus demands
for good and bad outcomes. The first line of Panel B indicates how shareholder voting rights
influence bonus demands in previously unregulated jurisdictions. We observe that advisory voting
rights increase the average bonus demand of CEOs by 4.73% for good states and by 9.19% for bad
states. By contrast, unconditionally binding voting rights markedly reduce the CEOs’ discretionary
bonus proposals. The reduction equals 23.97% for good project outcomes and 29.47% for bad
project outcomes. The eﬀect of conditionally binding voting rights is ambiguous. It appears that
they slightly increase bonus proposals for good performance (+4.76%) but considerably reduce
compensation for poor results (−25.25%). All eﬀects are significant (p < 0.000, two-tailed for
all cases) and more pronounced for unsuccessful project outcomes. Panel C shows results of a
robust regression of dummy variables for the three voting rights treatments on discretionary bonus
proposals for good and bad states. The coeﬃcients and t-values are consistent with the mean
diﬀerence tests in Panel B. In addition, we find that the regression model explains 34.6% (22.06%)
of the observed variance in project choice for good (bad) outcomes.
Lines 2 and 3 of Panel B show cross comparisons of the impact of diﬀerent shareholder voting
rights on CEOs’ discretionary bonus proposals. The results indicate that moving from advisory
to unconditionally binding voting rights significantly reduces the bonus proposals for both states.
The reduction equals 28.70% for good project outcomes and 38.66% for bad project outcomes.
Introducing conditionally binding instead of advisory voting rights has no impact on the bonus
proposals for successful projects but it significantly reduces the bonus proposals for bad outcomes
(−34.44%). Finally, moving from unconditionally to conditionally binding voting rights increases
the bonus demands for both outcomes, where the diﬀerence for good results (28.73%) is considerably
higher than for bad results (4.22%). All these diﬀerences are significant on a 1%-level (p < 0.000,
two-tailed) except for the diﬀerence in bonus proposals for bad projects between unconditionally
and conditionally binding voting rights that is significant on a 10%-level (t=1.92, p <0.055, two-
tailed).
Overall, our results suggest that binding shareholder voting rights are indeed an eﬀective instru-
ment to curb executive compensation. CEOs tend to significantly reduce their bonus demands for
a given project outcome whenever shareholders have binding voting rights. Evidently, the existence
of credible threats on the part of shareholders has a disciplining role on CEOs’ bonus proposals.
This ex ante eﬀect must be clearly distinguished from the direct reduction of the compensation due
to binding shareholder disapproval. A possible behavioral explanation for the phenomenon is the
hope that shareholders might be more willing to accept modest bonus proposals. Interestingly, the
opposite eﬀect seems to be caused by nonenforceable voting rights. In fact, the introduction of ad-
visory voting rights appears to stimulate bonus demands for both outcomes. The same observation
can be made for conditionally binding voting rights and successful project outcomes. These obser-
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vations cannot be rationalized in the context of our theoretical model but our experimental results
suggest that the announcement of an ineﬀective regulation can unintentionally provoke contrarian
behavior.
Result 2: (a) Binding shareholder voting rights are an eﬀective instrument to curb
executive compensation. (b) Nonenforceable voting rights induce higher bonus demands
and higher executive compensation.
Next, we analyze the impact of diﬀerent types of shareholder voting right regimes on voting
behavior. Since CEOs and shareholders do not interact for more than one period, we expect that
rational and self-interested shareholders reject the CEOs’ bonus proposals whenever they have the
right to do so. Panel A of Table 7 illustrates the impact of voting right types and project success
on equilibrium votes. It shows the diﬀerences in average voting dissent between successful and
unsuccessful projects and between advisory and unconditionally binding voting rights.
[please insert Table 7 about here]
The positive diﬀerences in the third column of Panel A indicate that shareholders reject CEO
bonus proposals more often in case of a poor project performance. In fact, a negative project
outcome increases voting dissent by 30.92% with advisory voting rights and does so by 8.89% with
unconditionally binding voting rights. However, the diﬀerence is only significant for advisory votes
(t = 7.16, p < 0.000, two-tailed). By contrast, enforceable voting rights increase the tendency to
reject bonus proposals for good outcomes by 11.94%. The diﬀerence is significant (t = 3.06, p <
0.002, two-tailed). The eﬀect for bad results has the opposite sign but it is not significant.
As an additional test for diﬀerences between treatments, we run a robust probit regression of
dummy variables for the relevant voting right treatments on shareholder’s voting dissent for success-
ful and unsuccessful projects. The results of the probit regression are shown in Panel B of Table 7.
The regression evaluates the impact of unconditionally and conditionally binding voting rights on
shareholder’s average voting dissent relative to advisory voting rights. With advisory votes, the av-
erage voting dissent equals Φ−1(−0.2522) = 0.4004 for successful projects and Φ−1(0.5524) = 0.7097
for unsuccessful projects. Both coeﬃcients are significant (p < 0.000, two-tailed). The introduc-
tion of unconditionally binding shareholder voting rights increases the average voting dissent by
11.94% to Φ−1(−0.2522 + 0.3020) = 0.5198, the coeﬃcient is significant (z-score = 3.05,p < 0.002,
two-tailed). By contrast, a move from advisory votes to unconditionally and conditionally binding
voting rights has no significant impact on the average voting dissent for unsuccessful projects.
Overall, our results suggest that shareholders actively use their voting rights to control CEO
compensation. This observation holds regardless of the enforceability of the voting rights. It also
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appears that shareholders are more willing to sacrifice a higher dividend to reward good performance
whereas the majority of voters rejects bonus proposals in case of poor performance. Nevertheless,
there remains a substantial fraction of shareholders that accepts the CEOs’ bonus proposals in case
of poor performance. This observation forces us to reject H2b.
Result 3: A substantial fraction of shareholders rejects bonus proposals whenever
they have the right to do so. The rejection rate is largely independent of the voting
right regime in place (unconditionally binding, conditionally binding, or advisory) but
increases with poor project performance.
Finally, we address the impact of shareholder voting rights on CEO compensation and firm
profit. Panel A of Table 8 summarizes the mean diﬀerences for the two variables among the
diﬀerent voting rights.
[please insert Table 8 about here]
We find that the introduction of advisory or conditionally binding shareholder voting rights
neither has a significant impact on executive compensation nor on firm profit. However, uncondi-
tionally binding shareholder voting rights significantly reduce average CEO compensation and firm
profit. This observation holds for all pairwise comparisons between the four regulatory alternatives.
The highest profit reduction (−1, 744.73) can be observed when unconditionally binding shareholder
voting rights are introduced in a previously unregulated jurisdiction. The highest reduction of CEO
compensation (−2, 188.90) and the lowest profit (−1, 388.68) reduction result when advisory share-
holder voting rights are replaced with unconditionally binding shareholder voting rights. Panel B
shows results of a robust regression of dummy variables for the three voting rights treatments on
CEO compensation and firm profit. The coeﬃcients and t-values are consistent with the mean
diﬀerence tests in Panel A. We also find that the regression model explains 20.26% of the observed
variance in CEO compensation but only 0.90% of the observed variance in firm profit. These results
are largely in line with the predictions from our theoretical model, so that we cannot reject H3a
and H3b. However, since conditionally binding shareholder voting rights have no significant impact
on CEO pay and firm profit, we must reject H3c.
Result 4: (a) Advisory and conditionally binding shareholder voting rights have no sig-
nificant impact on firm profit and executive compensation. (b) Unconditionally binding
shareholder voting rights reduce both, firm profit and executive compensation signifi-
cantly.
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5 Summary and conclusions
We conduct an experiment to study the consequences of diﬀerent shareholder voting right regimes
on CEOs’ investment incentives, shareholders’ voting behavior, executive compensation, and firm
profit. The experiment is based on a theoretical model in which a CEO must be motivated to take
a goal congruent decision on a risky project on behalf of her shareholders. The CEO is privately
informed about the probability of success and therefore essential for an eﬃcient project choice. To
induce a goal congruent project selection, the firm oﬀers the CEO a bonus contract based on the
realized project outcome. To make sense of shareholder voting rights, we let the CEO have some
discretion over the size of her bonus. At the beginning of each period, the manager can make
restricted bonus proposals in case of success and failure of the risky project. After the project
outcome is realized, shareholders vote on the CEO’s bonus proposal, provided they have the right
to do so.
We consider three diﬀerent types of shareholder voting right regimes and compare them to a
traditional world in which shareholders have no say on pay. First, we study advisory shareholder
votes on compensation. Second, we consider unconditionally binding shareholder votes where
shareholders can reject the CEO’s bonus regardless of the project’s performance. Third, we consider
conditionally binding voting rights where shareholders vote on the bonus proposal only in case of
poor performance while having no say on the bonus in case of project success.
The theoretical analysis of equilibrium strategies under the four governance regimes suggests
that no voting rights and advisory voting rights are economically equivalent. Since shareholders
cannot influence compensation, the CEO always makes a goal congruent project choice but extracts
the maximum possible compensation. In contrast, binding voting rights suﬀer from shareholders’
moral hazard. Once the CEO has selected the risky project, dividend maximizing shareholders have
a strict incentive to extract the CEO’s bonus ex post. A rational CEO anticipates this strategy and
chooses the risk-free project to avoid the expropriation of her bonus. The parties face a sequential
prisoner’s dilemma that reduces both, firm profit and executive compensation. This outcome can
be avoided if binding voting rights are limited to poor performance. Since the CEO can still extract
rents if the project is successful, she has goal congruent investment incentives if the expected bonus
for a successful project is suﬃciently large. We test our theoretical model in a laboratory experiment
with 250 participants. Our experimental study largely confirms the predictions of the theoretical
model and provides some additional insights. The findings can be summarized as follows:
• Advisory and conditionally binding voting rights do not distort CEOs’ investment incen-
tives. By contrast, binding voting rights undermine investment incentives and lead to goal
incongruent project decisions.
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• Only binding shareholder voting rights are an eﬀective instrument to curb executive com-
pensation. In contrast, advisory shareholder voting rights do not reduce compensation. We
even find that nonenforceable voting rights have an adverse eﬀect on executive pay. In fact,
they seem to motivate CEOs to demand higher bonuses compared to the scenario where
shareholders have no voting rights. The latter eﬀect is small but statistically significant.
• A substantial fraction of shareholders rejects bonus proposals whenever they have the right
to do so. This eﬀect is largely independent of the voting right regime in place and it becomes
more pronounced in case of poor project performance.
• We find that advisory and conditionally binding voting rights have neither a significant impact
on compensation nor on profits. If shareholders have unconditionally binding voting rights,
they are able to capture a larger fraction of the project’s realized return. This in turn,
discourages the CEO to invest in the risky project in the first place and forces her to choose
the riskless project instead. The resulting net eﬀect is negative so that unconditionally binding
voting rights reduce both, executive compensation and profits.
Overall, our results suggest that regulators should carefully evaluate potential desirable and
undesirable consequences of shareholder voting rights. Our study shows that advisory shareholder
voting rights are ineﬀective in curbing executive compensation. In addition, they even bear the
potential to stimulate excessive pay demands in poorly governed firms. Conversely, unconditionally
binding voting rights are an eﬀective instruments to curb executive pay. However, they also distort
CEO investment incentives which results in reduced firm profits. These negative consequences can
be avoided by conditionally binding voting rights. The latter regime eﬀectively curbs executive pay
in case of poor performance. Moreover, it does not undermine investment incentives if expected
CEO rents in case of good performance remain suﬃciently large. In our experiment, this condition
is met because the maximum bonus in case of project failure is rather small as compared to
the maximum bonus in case of project success. However, the more important expected rents of
poorly performing projects become for the CEO’s investments incentives, the more likely it is that
conditionally binding voting rights will adversely aﬀect the CEO’s investment incentives.
We view our analysis as a first step towards a better understanding of the interplay among
shareholder voting rights, investment incentives, executive compensation and firm profits. An
obvious omission of our study is the analysis of multiperiod relations between management and
shareholders. With repeated interaction between identical players, issues such as voluntary coop-
eration as well as reputational concerns might come into play and aﬀect the eﬃciency of voting
right regimes. In this study, we focused on the comparison of alternative voting right regimes while
restricting the analysis to one-shot relationships. As a consequence, our results primarily apply to
the relationship between management and short-term oriented equity investors. Nonetheless, we
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think that multiperiod issues of shareholder voting rights as they arise between management and
long-term investors are another interesting area for future research.
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Tab. 1: Opportunity set and payoffs in Experimental Currency Units (ECU) 
 
Project State Project return Salary Bonus CEO pay Firm profit 
P1 - 10,000 2,000 0 2,000 8,000 
Success 25,000 0 0 – 5,000 0 – 5,000 25,000 - CEO pay P2 












Tab. 2: Project choice and mean bonus proposals for successful and unsuccessful projects 
 
Project choice Mean bonus proposal 
Treatment Type of voting right P1 (riskless) P2 (risky) Success Failure 









































Table 2 shows absolute numbers of riskless and risky project choices and mean bonus proposals for successful and unsuccessful 
projects for all shareholder voting right regimes and the relevant sample. Relative percentages of risky and riskless project choices 




















Tab. 3: Distribution of shareholder votes for successful and unsuccessful projects 
 
Shareholder votes given project outcome 
Project successful Project failure Treatment Type of voting right 
Vote = yes Vote = no Vote = yes Vote = no 














T4 Conditionally binding – – 39 (26.17 %) 
110 
(73.83 %) 








Table 3 shows the absolute numbers of shareholder’s acceptance and refusal decisions for all possible combinations of 
project outcome and shareholder voting right regimes. Relative percentages of yes and no votes for successful and 










Tab. 4: Mean CEO compensation, firm profit and total welfare. 
 
Treatment Type of voting right Mean CEO compensation 
Mean firm 
profit 
Mean total  
welfare 


























Table 4 shows Mean CEO compensation, firm profit and total welfare for all shareholder voting right regimes. Firm profit 
is CEO realized project return minus CEO compensation. Total welfare is firm profit + CEO compensation = project 




















Tab. 5: Impact of shareholder voting rights on project choice 
 
 
Panel A: Mean differences in project choice 
 
Treatment / Type of voting right  Advisory  Unconditionally binding  Conditionally binding 























Panel B: Robust probit regression of treatment dummies on project choice 
 
Treatment / Type of voting right  Coefficient  z-score  p-value 
Baseline (No voting right)   1.7435  19.49  0.000*** 
Advisory  -0.0347  -0.28  0.781 
Unconditionally binding  -1.6091  -15.54  0.000*** 
Conditionally binding  -0.0986  -0.81  0.420 
Number of Observations and   
overall Significance 
 n = 2500  2 = 467.38  0.000*** 
McFadden's pseudo R2  0.2530     
 
 
Panel A shows the mean differences in project choice between treatments/shareholder voting right regimes relative to the reference treatment 
given in the first column. Mean project choice is the percentage of risky project choices, t-values for mean differences are given in 
parentheses. 
Panel B shows results for the robust probit regression of treatment dummies for the different shareholders voting right regimes on the project 
selection. The coefficient for the baseline treatment (no voting rights) is the constant of the regression. The coefficients for advisory, 
unconditionally binding and conditionally binding voting rights measure the marginal effect of the change in the shareholder voting right 
regime on the likelihood of risk project choice relative to the baseline treatment. 
***, **, * Indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, two-tailed, respectively. 
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Panel A: Means and mean differences between relative size of discretionary bonus proposals 
 






 difference  t-stats  p-value 
Baseline (No voting right)  0.9226  0.8042  0.1185***  8.02  0.0000 
Advisory  0.9700  0.8961  0.0739***  7.85  0.0000 
Unconditionally binding  0.6829  0.5095  0.1734***  8.68  0.0000 
Conditionally binding  0.9702  0.5517  0.4185***  29.02  0.0000 





Panel B: Mean differences in relative size of discretionary bonus proposals 
 
 Advisory  Unconditionally binding  Conditionally binding Treatment / Type 














































Panel C: Robust regression of treatment dummies on relative size of discretionary bonus proposals 
 
Treatment / Type of 
voting right  
rbonus 
success  t-stats  p-value 
 rbonus 
failure  t-stats  p-value 
Baseline  
(No voting right) 
0.9226  131.64  0.000***  0.8042  61.81  0.000*** 
Advisory  0.0473  6.10  0.000***  0.0919  5.85  0.000*** 
Unconditionally binding -0.2397  -18.88  0.000***  -0.2947  -13.80  0.000*** 
Conditionally binding 0.0476  5.94  0.000***  -0.2525  -13.27  0.000*** 
Number of Observations 
and overall Significance 
n =2155  F=238.05  0.000***  n=2155  F=231.43  0.000*** 
Percentage of Variance 
Explained (R2) 
34.60%      22.06%     
 
Panel A shows the means in relative size of CEOs’ discretionary bonus proposals for successful and unsuccessful projects and the mean 
differences between the two for all treatments/shareholder voting right regimes and the relevant sample, given that the risky project was 
selected. 
Panel B shows the mean differences in relative size of CEOs’ discretionary bonus proposals for successful and unsuccessful projects between 
treatments/shareholder voting right regimes relative to the reference regime given in the first column. T-values for mean differences are 
given in parentheses. 
Panel C shows results for robust regressions of treatment dummies for the different shareholders voting right regimes on CEOs’ relative size 
of discretionary bonus proposals for successful and unsuccessful projects. The coefficient for the baseline treatment (no voting rights) is 
the constant of the regression. The coefficients for advisory, unconditionally binding and conditionally binding voting rights measure the 
marginal effect of the change in the shareholder voting right regime on CEOs’ relative size of discretionary bonus proposals. 
rbonus success = relative size of CEOs’ discretionary bonus proposal for successful projects measured as a percentage of the maximum 
bonus of 5,000 experimental currency units (ECU). 
rbonus failure = relative size of CEOs’ discretionary bonus proposal for unsuccessful projects measured as a percentage of the maximum 
bonus of 1,000 experimental currency units (ECU). 
***, **, * Indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, two-tailed, respectively. 
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Panel A: Mean and mean differences in voting dissent for successful and unsuccessful projects 
 
Treatment / Type of voting right  Project successful  
 Project 
failure 
 Difference in voting dissent 
relative to project success 
Baseline (Advisory voting right) 
 
 0.4004  0.7097        0.3092*** (7.16) 
Unconditionally binding  
 
 0.5198  0.6087  0.0889 (1.33) 
Difference in voting dissent relative 
to voting right type 









Panel B: Robust probit regression of treatment dummies on voting dissent 
 
Treatment / Type of 
voting right  
vote 
success  z-score  p-value 
 vote 
failure  z-score  p-value 
Baseline  
(Advisory voting right) 
-0.2522  -4.25  0.000***  0.5524  5.18  0.000*** 
Unconditionally binding 0.3020  3.05  0.002***  -0.2765  -1.48  0.138 
Conditionally binding –  –  –  0.0855  0.56  0.578 
Number of Observations 
and overall Significance 
n=709  2=9.33  0.002***  n=373  2=3.74  0.154 
McFadden's pseudo R2 0.0096      0.0082     
 
 
Panel A shows the means and mean differences in voting dissent for successful and unsuccessful projects with advisory and unconditionally 
binding voting rights. Voting dissent is the percentage of No-votes to the CEOs’ bonus proposals for a given voting right regime and 
project outcome (0.01 equals 1 %). Differences are determined relative to advisory voting rights and successful projects, t-values for 
mean differences are given in parentheses. 
Panel B shows results for robust probit regressions of treatment dummies for the relevant shareholders voting right regimes on shareholders’ 
voting dissent relative to the voting dissent for advisory shareholder voting rights. The coefficient for the baseline treatment (advisory 
voting rights) is the constant of the probit regression. The coefficients for unconditionally binding and conditionally binding voting 
rights measure the marginal effect of the change in the shareholder voting right regime on the likelihood of a no vote by shareholders. 
Vote success = vote given a successful project outcome. The variable is coded as 1 if the shareholder has refused and 0 if the shareholder 
accepted the CEO’s bonus proposal. 
Vote failure = vote given an unsuccessful project outcome. The variable is coded as 1 if the shareholder has refused and 0 if the shareholder 
accepted the CEO’s bonus proposal. 

























Panel A: Mean differences in CEO compensation and firm profit between voting right regimes 
 
 Advisory  Unconditionally binding  Conditionally binding Treatment / Type of 






 CEO comp  Firm profit  CEO comp  Firm profit 
Baseline  


































Panel B: Robust regression of treatment dummies on CEO compensation and firm profit 
 
Treatment / Type 
of voting right  
CEO 
comp.  t-stats  p-value 
 Firm 
profit  t-stats  p-value 
Baseline  
(No voting right) 
3,616.67  51.38  0.000***  16,086.45  57.63  0.000*** 
Advisory 152.92  1.55  0.122  -356.05  -0.90  0.366 
Unconditionally 
binding 
-2,035.98  -23.19  0.000***  -1,744.73  -3.98  0.000*** 








20.26%      0.90%     
 
 
Panel A shows the mean differences in CEO compensation and firm profit between shareholder voting right regimes relative to the reference 
regime given in the first column. CEO compensation and firm profit are measured in experimental currency units (ECU),  
t-values are given in parentheses. 
Panel B shows results for robust regressions of treatment dummies for the different shareholders voting right regimes on CEO compensation 
and firm profit. The coefficient for the baseline treatment (no voting rights) is the constant of the regression. The coefficients for 
advisory, unconditionally binding and conditionally binding voting rights measure the marginal effect of the change in the shareholder 
voting right regime on CEO compensation and firm profit. 
CEO comp. = CEO compensation measured in experimental currency units (ECU). 
Firm profit = firm profit measured in experimental currency units (ECU). 
***, **, * Indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, two-tailed, respectively. 
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Appendix: Miscellaneous Experiment Results 
 
Tab. A-1: Breakdown of participants into treatments, sessions, and matching groups 
 
Number of participants in matching group (MG) Treatment Session 
MG1 MG2 MG3 MG4 
Total 
1 8 8 8 8 32 T1 
2 8 8 8 8 32 
64 
1 8 8 8 8 32 T2 
2 8 8 8 8 32 
64 
1 8 8 8 6 30 T3 
2 8 8 8 4 28 
58 
1 8 8 8 8 32 T4 
2 8 8 8 8 32 
64 
Total number of participants 250 
 
 
Tab. A-2: Average payoff realized by CEOs and shareholders 
 
Payoff Treatment Type of voting right CEO Shareholder 
T1 None 45.09 (7.01) 
20.36 
(0.58) 
T2 Advisory 46.88 (3.51) 
19.90 
(0.60) 
T3 Unconditionally binding 20.58 (3.12) 
18.26 
(2.45) 















Table A-2 shows the mean payoff realized by the two different types of participants for all treatments. Standard 
deviations are reported in parentheses. The last line reports the minimum and maximum payoffs realized across all 
treatments. Payoffs were paid out in CHF and calculated on the basis of realized compensation and shareholder dividends 
during the experiment. For 1,000 Experimental currency units (ECU) participants received 0.60 CHF. In addition, each 
participant received a fixed participation fee of 0.60 CHF. 
 
 
Tab. A-3: Mean CEO compensation, firm profit and total welfare given choice of risky project. 
 
Treatment Type of voting right Mean CEO compensation 
Mean firm 
profit 
Mean total  
welfare 


























Table A-3 shows Mean CEO compensation, firm profit and total welfare for all shareholder voting right regimes given 
that CEO has chosen the risky project P2. Firm profit is CEO realized project return minus CEO compensation. Total 
welfare is firm profit + CEO compensation = project return. All values measured in experimental currency units (ECU). 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. The riskless project P1 yields compensation of 2,000 ECU, firm profit of 
8,000 ECU and total welfare of 10,000 ECU. 
